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This paper shows that, in a group-lending environment characterized by 
positive assortative matching, a microfinance institution can achieve a 
Pareto improvement by promoting negative matching among borrowers. 
Some new implications are: i) borrowers may be better off under mixed 
groups; ii) a heterogeneous group lending equilibrium is possible even 
when individual or homogeneous group equilibria do not exist. 
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1    Introduction 
 
Group lending is probably the most popular instrument used by microfinance 
institutions to enforce the repayment of loans. The typical feature of such lending 
scheme is that borrowers are required to form groups where all members are 
considered jointly liable for each other’s loan repayment. This mechanism has 
drawn the attention of a growing literature on credit market imperfections, which 
shows that group lending can help mitigating the problems of information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers1. In particular, the present paper is 
based on the results of Van Tassel (1999) and Ghatak (1999), who argue that 
group lending always leads to positive assortative matching among micro-
entrepreneurs. Namely, in a population of potential borrowers with different risk 
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1 See Stiglitz (1990), and the literature that followed. 
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profiles, individuals will sort themselves into homogeneous risk groups. Low-risk 
individuals would never agree to match with high-risk types, even if side 
payments among group members are possible.  
     This paper is built on the adverse selection framework of Ghatak (2000), in 
which the credit market can be characterized by either underinvestment (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981), or overinvestment (de Meza and Webb, 1987). Ghatak (2000) 
considers two types of potential borrowers (safe and risky) and compares their 
expected utilities under homogeneous or heterogeneous (mixed) matching. In this 
comparison, both homogeneous and mixed group payoffs are based on the same 
financial contract offered by a benevolent microfinance institution (MFI). That is, 
the contractual terms (individual and joint liability payments) are considered 
exogenous, irrespective of the final composition of borrowers’ types within the 
group financed. Under these conditions, the match-payoff function is always 
supermodular (see Becker, 1973 and Topkis, 1998), and the assortative matching 
can never be negative. The present paper argues that the payoff of mixed groups 
should actually be based on a different financial contract. Specifically, the MFI 
should offer a menu of two different generic contracts, one designed for 
homogeneous groups, and one for mixed groups. In each of these contracts, the 
MFI must break even, and so let borrowers choose the type of partner that 
maximizes their expected payoff. The two main results of the article are:  
 
i) Borrowers may be better off under mixed groups.  
This means that a MFI can achieve a Pareto improvement, over the equilibrium 
characterized by positive assortative matching, by promoting negative matching 
among borrowers. This conclusion is similar to those derived in some other 
papers, in particular Sadoulet (1999), Roy Chowdhury (2007) and Guttman 
(2008), in which the assortative matching may become negative if group lending 
contracts incorporate the threat of not being refinanced in the future. 
In the paper, negative matching occurs when the potential homogeneous group 
contract is pooling (i.e. different group types receive the same contract) and the 
proportion of risky types is higher than a given threshold, whereas the assortative 
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matching is positive when the number of risky types is low. The reason is that, in 
an asymmetric information environment, when the homogeneous contract is 
pooling with a low proportion of risky types, safe borrowers receive a payoff 
close to their first-best level and, thus, they would never find it profitable to 
choose a mixed group. If, instead, the number of risky types is large, safe 
borrowers obtain a payoff close to their reservation level and, if monetary 
transfers among group members are possible, they may end up being better off 
under mixed matching. 
The paper also shows that, when the potential homogeneous contract is separating 
(i.e. groups receive different incentive-compatible contracts), borrowers are 
indifferent between positive and negative assortative matching. Indeed, in a 
separating homogeneous equilibrium, safe and risky types obtain their respective 
full-information profits. And, since in this case the sum of expected returns of 
homogenous groups (safe-safe and risky-risky) is equal to that of mixed groups 
(safe-risky and risky-safe), borrowers can achieve the same separating full-
information profits in a mixed equilibrium, after ex-post transfers. 
The intuition for risk heterogeneity is that, in some circumstances, safe types may 
be willing to trade some of their low-risk profile in exchange for side payments 
from risky partners. Mixed matching can be explained by the desire for an intra-
group insurance system in addition to joint liability2. This kind of insurance may 
operate through transfers of money, food, labour services and gifts among group 
members. It is well known that credit groups can also serve the role of mutual 
assistance in rural and poor environments, and empirical evidence of this self-help 
behaviour is reported by Carpenter and Sadoulet (2000), Dupas and Robinson 
(2009) and Fafchamps and La Ferrara (2012), either within or outside a formal 
mutual-credit institution. Besides, though the prevalent view is that group lending 
leads to homogeneous risk matching (for example Ahlin, 2009), a number of 
authors report that heterogeneity is in some cases the optimal form of risk-sharing 
arrangement. For example, evidence on negative matching (or at least the absence 
                                                 
2 The model developed in this paper is static and based on universal risk neutrality, thus the 
borrowers’ need for risk heterogeneity may be seen as an opportunity to further increase their 
expected profits with respect to homogeneous matching (it is simple to argue that, in the case of 
risk aversion, there would be an additional incentive to form mixed groups).  
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of positive matching) can be found in Van Tassel (2000) himself, Carpenter and 
Sadoulet (2000), Lensik and Mehrteab (2003), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), and 
Berhan et al. (2009) 3. 
The most direct policy implication of the paper is that MFIs, in designing their 
financial contracts, should also consider the possibility of heterogeneous risk 
matching as a possible additional self-insurance mechanism.  
 
ii) A mixed equilibrium is possible when homogeneous equilibria do not exist, 
and even when the reservation income of borrowers is equal to zero.  
In the underinvestment setup of Ghatak (2000), safe types cannot receive 
individual liability contracts because their expected payoff is not sufficient to 
cover the average loan repayment. This is the classic adverse selection problem, 
whereby risky projects drive safe types out of the credit market. Ghatak (2000) 
shows that, if the safe type’s expected return is large enough to guarantee the 
presence of a joint liability equilibrium, group lending can solve the rationing 
problem.  
On the other hand, underinvestment may obtain even under joint liability in two 
possible circumstances: a) if the safe type’s expected output does not satisfy the 
participation constraint in group lending (i.e. the quality of projects is too low); b) 
if the reservation income of borrowers is zero (a reasonable assumption in 
underdeveloped contexts). This paper argues that, in such cases, a mixed 
equilibrium may exist and avoid the credit rationing solution. This implies that 
mixed lending can also be seen as an instrument for MFIs to promote 
entrepreneurial activity and alleviate (at least short-term) poverty. This result can 
be related to the strand of the literature that explores the so-called depth of 
                                                 
3 Another possible explanation is offered in the empirical work by Berhabe et al. (2009). In their 
study on Ethiopian group lending schemes, the authors find support for risk heterogeneity, and 
posit that lending groups can be viewed as social networks, which may help fostering trust, 
reputation and cooperation among members. They show that the high repayment rates in joint 
liability lending may also depend on social ties and peer monitoring activity within groups, even 
when borrowers match heterogeneously.   
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outreach, that is the extent to which MFIs are able to reach the poorest segment of 
the population4. 
 
     It is important to stress that the mixed equilibrium described in the model may 
be, in some cases, subject to re-matching of borrowers. In fact, since the MFI 
cannot observe the final composition of groups, if a mixed contract is offered, 
mixed group members may have the incentive to re-match in homogeneous pairs 
and choose the mixed contract in order to raise their overall payoffs. This paper 
shows that the negative assortative matching can be a stable equilibrium if the 
MFI introduces the threat of withdrawing the mixed contract if loan applications 
are not compatible with heterogeneous lending.  
     The theoretical results of the present paper are not only relevant for the 
microcredit literature, but can also be extended to other contexts that involve the 
formation of peer groups through a self-selection mechanism. A feature of the 
model is that, since mixed lending is based on different contractual terms with 
respect to homogeneous lending, the group payoff function is not always 
supermodular. As in the marriage market of Becker (1973), the payoff of mixed 
groups can be large enough to reverse the sign of matching among individuals. In 
other words, the proportion of low-risk types in the population (the quality of the 
environment in group lending) can alter the trade-off between substitutability and 
complementarity in the payoff function. Thus, even though low-risk borrowers are 
generally considered complements in group lending, they may become substitutes 
if their proportion is so low as to make homogeneous contracts particularly 
unfavorable. This conclusion is similar to that obtained in the labor-market 
equilibrium of Kremer and Maskin (1996), where the matching between firms and 
employees depends on the distribution of skill types and, in particular, on the 
relative scarcity of high-skilled workers.  
     The paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the underinvestment setup of 
Ghatak (2000), where projects are classified in terms of second-order stochastic 
                                                 
4 A part of the literature on microfinance is concerned with the possibility that the very poor can be 
excluded from microcredit programs. One of the reasons may be the rush of many MFIs to pursue 
profitability at the expense of outreach. See, for a discussion on this topic, Navajas et al. (2000), 
and Armendariz de Aghion and Szafarz (2011). 
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dominance. Section 3 introduces the mixed lending contract. Section 4 derives the 
sign, positive or negative, of the assortative matching. Section 5 discusses the 
stability of the mixed equilibrium. Section 6 shows that a mixed equilibrium may 
exist even when homogeneous equilibria are not possible. Section 7 concludes. 
The Appendix contains an extension of the overinvestment setup of Ghatak 
(2000), in which projects are ranked in a first-order stochastic dominance sense.  
 
 
2    Homogeneous Matching 
 
Ghatak (2000) analyzes a model with two types of risk-neutral potential 
borrowers, safe and risky, endowed with two different projects. Each project 
requires a fixed investment of 1. Safe types produce sy  with probability sp , while 
risky types produce sr yy   with probability rp ; both projects yield nothing with 
the complementary probabilities. Borrowers have no endowment, and thus need a 
financial loan. As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it is rs pp   and 
yypyp rrss  .  
There is a risk-neutral benevolent MFI/bank with an opportunity cost of capital of 
 . Borrowers know each other’s quality, whereas the MFI only knows the 
exogenous proportion of risky types, )1 ,0(  and safe types, 1 . This 
asymmetry of information leads to a typical adverse selection problem. The bank 
can offer either individual liability or joint liability contracts. The individual 
contract is a standard debt contract with a fixed repayment, r . In a joint liability 
contract, instead, borrowers form groups of two members. In this case, a 
successful borrower, in addition to the individual repayment, r , pays also a joint 
liability component, c , if the other group member is unsuccessful.  
Gathak (2000) assumes that  
 
,uy    and              (A1) 
,u
p
py s                  (A2) 
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where rs ppp  )1(   , and u  is the reservation income of borrowers.  
Under (A1), both projects are socially efficient, i.e. their expected output is larger 
than the resources employed. For (A2), safe types are credit rationed under 
individual liability lending, i.e. their expected profit is not enough to cover the 
average loan repayment. Therefore, to avoid the rationing problem, the MFI is 
forced to offer joint liability contracts.  
Under the joint liability contract, ),( cr , the expected payoff of a borrower of type 
i, by teaming up with a partner of type j, is  
 
cpprypcryppryppcrU jiiiijiijiij )1()())(1()(),(  .            
 
Ghatak (2000) shows that, even if side payments among group members are 
possible5, borrowers always choose homogeneous groups, i.e. the assortative 
matching is positive. The reason is as follows. Given the expected loss of safe 
types from matching with risky partners,  
 
cpppcrUcrU rsssrss )(),(),(  ,  
 
and the expected gain of risky from matching with safe,  
 
cpppcrUcrU rsrrrrs )(),(),(  ,  
 
it is  
 
0))(()],(),([)],(),([  cppppcrUcrUcrUcrU rsrsrrrssrss .               (1) 
 
                                                 
5 The transfer can be interpreted as a promise to pay the partner from the final return, if positive.    
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That is, the expected loss of safe borrowers is larger than the expected gain of 
risky borrowers. As a result, safe types would never accept to form a mixed group 
even after a monetary transfer from risky types.  
     The MFI maximizes a weighted sum of the expected payoffs of the 
representative borrowers, i.e.  
 
)(P : ),( ),( )1( max
,
crUcrU rrsscr   , 
 
where   is the relative social weight attached to risky types (which can be 
different from  ).  
The joint liability contract must satisfy the borrowers’ limited liability constraint. 
i.e., a successful borrower must be able to pay both individual and joint liability, 
or 
 
crys  ,                (LLC) 
 
where we only need to consider the (lower) return of safe types.  
The equilibrium can be separating or pooling. In a separating equilibrium, 
borrowers receive two different incentive compatibility contracts, ),( ss cr  and 
),( rr cr , which satisfy the following incentive constraints,     
 
),(),( rrssssss crUcrU  , and            (ICss) 
),(),( ssrrrrrr crUcrU  .            (ICrr) 
 
The participation constraints under group lending are 
 
ucrU ss ),( , and                          (PCss) 
ucrU rr ),( .              (PCrr) 
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Separating contracts derive from the bank’s zero-profit conditions on safe and 
risky groups, 
 
0)1(  sssss cpprp , and            (0πCss) 
0)1(  rrrrr cpprp .           (0πCrr) 
 
From (0πCss) and (0πCrr), we have )/()1(ˆ rsrs ppppr    and )/(ˆ rs ppc  . 
Therefore, separating equilibria exist if the (LLC) holds, or crys ˆˆ  , i.e. under 
the assumption 
 





r
s
p
py 1 .                 (A3) 
 
To rule out negative repayments, Ghatak (2000) also assumes that 1 rs pp .  
Figure 1a provides an example in which, under (A3), the (LLC) is above the 
contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr . The range of separating equilibria is between point X and )ˆ,ˆ( cr  for 
safe types, and between )ˆ,ˆ( cr  and )0,/( rp  for risky types6.   
     In a pooling equilibrium, borrowers choose the same contract, ),( cr , which 
derives from the bank’s zero-profit condition on the average group, 
 
0])1([])1()[1(   cpprpcpprp rrrsss .             )0( POOLC  
 
Pooling equilibria may exist under a less restrictive assumption on the (LLC), i.e. 
 
uppy s   )/( ,                 (A4) 
 
where )1,0(/])1[( 22   pppp srs  . An example is reported in figure 1b, 
where (A3) does not hold, but (A4) holds. In this case, the (LLC) is below )ˆ,ˆ( cr , 
                                                 
6 See Ghatak (2000) for a complete description of fig. 1a and 1b. 
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but above the point where the safe type’s participation constraint becomes 
binding, i.e. above the intersection between )0( ssPC  and the bank’s pooling 
contract line, (0πCPOOL), such as point B. The range of pooling equilibria is the 
segment between point A and B. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remark 1: in Ghatak (2000) there is an ex-post incentive compatibility problem, 
since in the separating contract, )ˆ,ˆ( cr , the amount of joint liability, cˆ , exceeds the 
individual liability, rˆ . Thus, if )ˆ,ˆ( cr  is offered, there may be the incentive for the 
group, when one member fails, to announce that both had success and pay rˆ2  
instead of cr ˆˆ   (this is also true for all pooling equilibria above the 45-degree 
Figure 1 – Underinvestment (homogeneous equilibria). 
a) Separating contracts.  
b) Pooling contracts.  
c 
(a) 
r 
)ˆ,ˆ( cr  
LLC 
c 
r 
p
  
B 
(b) 
LLC 
sSC0  
rrC0  POOLC0  
A 
0ssPC  
rp
  
rp
  
X 
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line in fig. 1a and 1b). A possible theoretical solution, as proposed by 
Gangopadhyay et al. (2005), may be to impose the additional constraint cr   to 
make incentive compatible to reveal default (i.e. focus on contracts on or below 
the 45-degree line).  
Instead, in the present paper it will be shown that in the mixed matching 
equilibrium described in the following section, it is always cr  , so the full-
information outcome can be achieved without imposing the condition that cr  . 
 
 
3    Mixed Matching 
 
A distinctive feature of the model of Section 2 is that the expected utilities of 
mixed groups, ),( crU sr  and ),( crU rs , derive from the same contract, ),( cr , 
designed for homogeneous lending. Consequently, in the MFI’s zero-profit 
conditions, )0( ssC , )0( rrC  and )0( POOLC , the probability of receiving the joint 
liability payment, c , is always based on the homogeneous product )1( ii pp  , for 
rsi , . In contrast, this section argues that the MFI should design two different 
joint liability contracts, one for homogeneous groups and one specifically for 
mixed groups. Then, borrowers will choose their most profitable contract and, 
consequently, will determine the nature of group matching.  
     The benevolent MFI chooses the mixed contract terms in order to maximize 
the expected payoffs of potential heterogeneous groups. Since we cannot attach a 
social weight to a specific mixed group type, the MFI’s program can be written as 
 
)( MIXP : ),(),( max, crUcrU rssrcr  .   
 
The mixed equilibrium contract derives from the MFI’s mixed zero-profit 
conditions,  
 
0)1(  cpprp srs , and       )0( srC  
0)1(  cpprp rsr .           )0( rsC  
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In (0πCsr) and (0πCrs), the bank takes into account the fact that, whenever 
borrowers choose a mixed group, the joint liability component, c , is paid with the 
mixed probability )1( ji pp  . 
Solving (0πCsr) and (0πCrs), we obtain  
 
rsrs
MIXMIX pppp
cr

  . 
 
Note that, under mixed lending, the equilibrium contract is pooling and unique, so 
we have neither separating nor other pooling equilibria in addition to ),( MIXMIX cr . 
As discussed in remark 1, MIXMIX cr  , so under mixed matching we do not derive 
the ex-post incentive problem of Ghatak (2000). 
The equilibrium must satisfy the borrowers’ participation constraints7, and the 
mixed limited liability constraint,  
  
rsrs
MIXMIXs pppp
cry

 2 .        (LLCMIX) 
 
The mixed match-output utilities can be written as  
 






rsrs
r
ssMIXrsMIXssMIXMIXsr pppp
pypcpprypcrU )2()1()(),( ,      (2a) 






rsrs
s
rrMIXsrMIXrrMIXMIXrs pppp
pypcpprypcrU )2()1()(),( .    (2b) 
 
The payoffs in (2a) and (2b) are always positive under (LLCMIX). 
 
                                                 
7 It is not necessary to specify the heterogeneous participation constraints because they will be 
automatically satisfied if (PCss) and (PCrr) hold.  
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Remark 2: the model of Section 2 is built on the assumption of universal risk 
neutrality. Ghatak (2000) shows that risk aversion on the borrowers’ side would 
lead to inefficient risk sharing under group lending. The reason is that joint 
liability involves the additional risk of group default compared to individual 
liability lending. In contrast, in the present paper the presence of intermediate 
levels of profits and ex-post transfers, under mixed lending, would lower the 
variance of expected returns and make joint liability less costly for borrowers.  
 
 
4    Assortative Matching 
 
If the mixed contract is introduced, the MFI will have to deal with two 
maximization problems, )(P  of Section 2 for potential homogeneous groups, and 
)( MIXP  of Section 3 for potential mixed groups. In each of these contracts, the 
MFI must break even (even though we might also consider other forms of zero-
profit conditions), and so let borrowers choose their most profitable contract. 
Thus, the assortative matching expression, (1), derived in Section 2, can be 
rewritten as  
 
)],(),([)],(),([ crUcrUcrUcrU rrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss  ,           (1’) 
 
where the mixed-group utilities are compared with those obtained under 
homogeneous pairing (Section 5 will show that the MFI can prevent the formation 
of fake mixed groups, formed by pairs of safe-safe or risky-risky borrowers).  
     The following proposition shows that the sign of matching, positive or 
negative, is determined by the distribution of borrowers’ types. 
 
Proposition 1. The assortative matching, 
a) if (A3) holds, can be either positive or negative.  
b) if (A3) does not hold and (A4) holds, is positive when 21 , and negative 
otherwise.  
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Proof. 
a) If (A3) holds, the potential homogeneous contract is separating. Using (2a) and 
(2b), we can write (1’) as 
 
)]1()1([ )( 2 rrssrs ppppcppr  .                        (3) 
 
At the separating contract, )ˆ,ˆ( cr , (3) is equal to 0, thus borrowers are indifferent 
between homogeneous and mixed lending. 
b) If (A3) does not hold and (A4) holds, the homogeneous contract is pooling. 
Write )0( POOLC  as  
 
])1()[1(
]))(1[( 
22
rrssrr
rrs
pppppp
ppprc



 .  
 
By substituting this expression in (3), we derive 
 
)(
)1)()(1()1(
])1)[(](1)1(2[ rf
pppppp
rpppppp
rsrsrr
rsrsrs 



 .                     (4) 
 
At the contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr , which is also a pooling contract, the expression (1’), and 
thus )(rf , is equal to 0. So, we have that )(rf  is (weakly) increasing in r , along 
the )0( POOLC , if  
 
0
)1)()(1()1(
)](1)1(2[)(
0



rsrsrr
rsrs
C pppppp
pppp
dr
rdf
POOL



,               (5) 
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which is true if 21  (and if, as assumed, 1 rs pp )8. Therefore, for all 
potential pooling contracts on the )0( POOLC , the assortative matching expression 
(1’) is negative for 21 .                     ■ 
 
     The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. Given the extent of the 
(LLC), we can have potential separating and pooling homogeneous contracts. 
Under (A3), the potential homogeneous contract is separating, and both safe and 
risky firms receive their full-information payoffs, i.e.  ssss ypcrU )ˆ,ˆ(  and 
 rrrr ypcrU  )ˆ,ˆ( . Besides, in this case it is  
 
)(2),(),()ˆ,ˆ()ˆ,ˆ(  ycrUcrUcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrrrss ,              (6) 
 
i.e. the sum of safe and risky expected returns does not depend on the matching 
among borrowers9. Indeed, in (6) we compare the two extreme cases of lowest 
(separating equilibrium) and highest (mixed equilibrium) cross-subsidization 
between types. This implies that borrowers can always achieve an intermediate 
situation where they reallocate the sum of expected profits through ex-post side 
payments. Assume that risky types make the lowest possible transfer, t , to safe 
partners, i.e. such that )ˆ,ˆ(),( crUtcrU ssMIXMIXsr  . Hence, borrowers are equally 
well off under homogeneous or mixed matching for a transfer equal to  
 
rsrs
rs
rrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss pppp
ppcrUcrUcrUcrUt

 )()ˆ,ˆ(),(),()ˆ,ˆ( ,  
 
which is always feasible if the expression in (1’) is such that  
0)],(),([)],(),([  crUcrUcrUcrU rrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss .  
                                                 
8 The denominator of (5) is positive for each   (it is increasing in  , equal to )1( ss pp   for 
0 , and equal to )1( rr pp   for 1 ). 
9 This is also true for all other separating contracts in addition to )ˆ,ˆ( cr . 
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If (A3) does not hold, but (A4) holds, the potential homogeneous group contract is 
pooling (for example, all points between A’ and B’ in fig. 2a, and between C and 
D in fig. 2b are potential homogeneous pooling contracts), and we have the two 
following cases. 
If 21 , the bank’s pooling zero-profit line on homogeneous pooling contracts, 
)0( POOLC , is closer to the zero-profit line on safe groups, )0( ssC , as in fig. 2a. 
In this case, the cross-subsidy between borrowers is low, and safe types obtain a 
large expected payoff under positive matching. Mixed matching would imply a 
transfer so high that ),(),(),(),( crUcrUcrUcrU rrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss  , i.e. such 
that risky types would not be able to compensate safe partners for the additional 
risk of default. Thus, borrowers will never choose a mixed group, and the 
assortative matching is positive.  
If 21 , )0( POOLC  is closer to the zero-profit line on risky groups, )0( rrC , as 
in fig. 2b. In this case, the cross-subsidy is high, and safe firms would receive a 
low expected return under homogeneous contracts. In particular, they would 
obtain a payoff close to their reservation income, and thus they may find it 
profitable to sell part of their risk quality to risky types. This means that the 
matching is negative, i.e. ),(),(),(),( crUcrUcrUcrU rrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss  , and 
that there can be room for a Pareto improvement over positive assortative 
matching.  
Note that the potential homogeneous pooling equilibrium depends on the relative 
social weight,  , chosen by the MFI. For example, if 1 , the homogeneous 
contract is at the intersection between )0( POOLC  and the binding participation 
constraint of safe types, )0( ssPC , as point B’ in fig. 2a or D in fig. 2b. In this 
case, borrowers prefer homogeneous groups if (1’) is positive, i.e. if 
0/)](1)1(2[   uyp ss , which is true for 21  since 
0 uyp ss  under (A1). 
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4.1    Contract Composition 
 
This sub-section derives the final composition of group types if the possibility of 
mixed matching is taken into account by the MFI.  
According to Proposition 1, when (A3) holds, the potential homogeneous contract 
is separating, and the assortative matching can be either positive or negative. If 
borrowers choose homogeneous lending, in equilibrium we will observe a 
proportion 2/)1(   of safe groups and 2/  of risky groups. On the other hand, 
if borrowers prefer mixed matching, we should obtain a situation in which there 
are   1 ,min  mixed groups, along with  0 ,2/)21(max   safe groups and  
Figure 2 – Underinvestment (potential homogeneous pooling equilibria). 
a) Low θ ( POOLC0 closer to ssC0 ).  
b) High θ ( POOLC0 closer to rrC0 ).  
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 0 ,2/)12(max   risky groups, which receive homogeneous contracts. For the 
last two types of groups, the homogeneous separating equilibrium is the outcome 
of the classic two-stage Nash game analyzed in Section 2. On the basis of the 
specific combination of loan applications, the MFI will offer the corresponding 
number of homogeneous and mixed contracts.  
When (A3) does not hold, but (A4) holds, the potential homogeneous equilibrium 
is pooling and we need to distinguish between two cases: a) 21 ; b) 21 .  
 
a) 21 : if the proportion of risky types is low, the assortative matching is 
positive, so the bank will not offer the mixed contract. Again, we have 2/)1(   
safe groups and 2/  risky groups.  
 
b) 21 : if the proportion of risky types is high, the assortative matching is 
negative. In equilibrium, we should have two different lending arrangements: a 
proportion 1  of mixed groups, which is equal to the number of safe types (the 
less frequent type); a proportion   of risky borrowers who cannot team up with 
safe types and so are forced to group homogeneously or ask for individual liability 
contracts.  
 
 
5    Stability of the Mixed Equilibrium 
 
This section shows that the negative assortative matching can be a stable 
equilibrium. To restrict the following analysis assume that, if the potential 
homogeneous contract is separating, the MFI chooses not to introduce the mixed 
contract, so that the equilibrium is as described in Section 2.  
When the potential homogeneous equilibrium is pooling and 21 , the 
assortative matching should be negative, with a proportion 1  of mixed 
contracts and   of individual or homogeneous group contracts for risky 
borrowers. However, this contract structure can be subject to the re-matching of 
borrowers. In some cases, mixed groups (safe-risky) may have the incentive to re-
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match into homogeneous pairs (safe-safe or risky-risky), under the mixed 
contract, ),( MIXMIX cr , to further raise their payoffs with respect to true mixed 
pairing. Such re-matching may occur when the payoff under fake mixed groups 
(i.e. groups of homogeneous borrowers who sign the mixed contract) is higher 
than the one under true mixed lending, that is when  
 
tcrUcrU MIXMIXsrMIXMIXss  ),(),( ,    or   tcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXrr  ),(),( ,  
 
where t  is the ex-post transfer. Besides, the remaining risky borrowers, who 
cannot form mixed groups and are forced to receive homogenous group or 
individual loans, would obtain their full-information payoff, rr yp . So, they 
also have the incentive to form mixed groups and receive an additional payoff 
equal to  
 
0)/()()(),(  rsrsrsrrMIXMIXrr ppppppypcrU  ,  
 
where clearly we do not have to consider any transfer between risky types within 
a group. 
To avoid such deviations, which would make group lending unprofitable, we need 
to extend the reaction strategy of the MFI. This paper proposes the following four-
stage game.  
 
First stage: the bank offers a proportion of 1  mixed contracts, and   
homogeneous joint or individual contracts.  
 
Second stage: safe borrowers randomly choose their risky partners, and apply for 
mixed loans. The remaining risky borrowers (who cannot form mixed groups) will 
either match among themselves and apply for homogeneous lending, or choose 
individual liability contracts.  
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Third stage: the MFI commits to withdraw the mixed contract if the number of 
loans is not compatible with mixed matching. If the applications for ),( MIXMIX cr  
are different from 1 , the mixed contract is withdrawn and the bank will only 
offer homogeneous loans. 
 
Fourth stage: all contracts are executed, and the game ends.  
 
The following proposition shows that borrowers have no incentive to re-match.  
 
Proposition 2. Under the threat of withdrawing the mixed contract, the negative 
assortative matching is a stable equilibrium.  
 
Proof.  
If tcrUcrU MIXMIXsrMIXMIXss  ),(),(  and tcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXrr  ),(),( , 
borrowers have no incentive to re-match.  
 
If tcrUcrU MIXMIXsrMIXMIXss  ),(),(  and tcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXrr  ),(),( , safe 
borrowers have the incentive to re-match. If they do so, the applications for 
),( MIXMIX cr  would be equal to 2/)1(  , and the bank would withdraw the mixed 
contract. In this case, safe borrowers would lose the additional profit of mixed 
matching. 
 
If tcrUcrU MIXMIXsrMIXMIXss  ),(),(  and tcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXrr  ),(),( , risky 
borrowers have the incentive to re-match. If they deviate, the applications for 
),( MIXMIX cr would be 2/ , and the bank would withdraw the mixed contract. In 
this case, risky borrowers would lose the profits of mixed matching. 
 
If tcrUcrU MIXMIXsrMIXMIXss  ),(),(  and tcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXrr  ),(),( , all 
borrowers have the incentive to re-match. In this case, the applications for 
),( MIXMIX cr  would be 2/12/2/)1(    and, since the assortative matching 
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should be positive for 2/1 , the bank would withdraw the mixed contract, and 
all types would lose the profits of mixed matching.                         
 
Under the threat, the other risky borrowers, applying for homogeneous or 
individual loans, do not have the incentive to apply for the mixed contract (it is 
implicitly assumed that they have no intention to harm the other borrowers).       ■ 
 
     In real microcredit programs, where MFIs are usually benevolent, it is difficult 
to imagine that the threat described in the model should be applied in a very strict 
sense. In practice, it may be more reasonable to expect that, when the applications 
for ),( MIXMIX cr  are slightly different from 1 , it can still be desirable for the 
MFI to promote mixed matching, although it is more exposed to losses in case of 
default. Probably, MFIs would face the same problem under homogeneous 
lending if, for some reason, borrowers were to decide to match heterogeneously 
(for instance, due to the presence of unobservable individual characteristics in 
addition to the risk quality).  
Note that the MFI might use a similar withdrawing threat to encourage borrowers 
to accept their full-information individual liability contracts, )0,( sp  and 
)0,( rp . However, in this case, borrowers would lose the opportunity to profit 
from the ex-post insurance system allowed by group contracts. 
The idea behind the no-commitment stage analyzed in this paper is close in 
spirit to the renegotiation-proof strategy of Roy Chowdhury (2007), whereby 
equilibria must be subgame perfect and subgames are identified with the type of 
lending groups (homogeneous or mixed). Both types of strategies require some 
degree of coordination among agents which, however, may not be so 
unreasonable in the context of a group lending program, where MFIs usually have 
close interactions with the community of borrowers (as pointed out by Roy 
Chowdhury, 2007, for his renegotiation-proofness). For example, in their 
empirical study on the Georgian microcredit contract, Vigenina and Kritikos 
(2004) find that loan officers have a complementary role in assessing the risk 
profile of potential borrowers and in the group selection process. 
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     Note also that the threat of withdrawing the contract is different from that 
proposed by Wilson (1977). There, the author includes a withdrawing stage to the 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) game to prevent the cream-skimming of safe types 
within a perfectly competitive environment. In the present paper, the contract 
withdrawing is used to prevent the re-matching of borrowers who receive credit 
from a single benevolent MFI. In both cases, the bank can withdraw contracts that 
can become unprofitable, but the main difference is that the rationale for MFIs to 
find new and cost-effective ways to maximize the welfare of borrowers should not 
derive from the (short-term) profit-seeking behavior of competitive banks. 
Besides, in a model with a single  MFI, we do not derive the coordination problem 
that is usually associated with the commitment mechanism of Wilson (1977), 
namely the ability of lenders to observe any deviation made by each other, which 
seems incompatible with a perfect competition framework. The possibility to 
change the composition of contracts can well be consistent in the context of a non-
market organization, such as a large microfinance lender with some degree of 
monopoly power. 
 
 
6    Non-existence of Homogeneous Equilibria 
 
In the homogeneous matching equilibrium analyzed in Section 2, it is possible to 
observe a situation in which: 1) safe types are credit rationed under individual 
lending, i.e. the assumption (A2) holds, uppy s  )/( ; 2) the safe project’s 
expected output is at least large enough to guarantee the existence of a 
homogeneous pooling equilibrium, i.e. the assumption (A4) holds, 
uppy s   )/( . In this case, joint liability can solve the underinvestment 
problem of safe borrowers, which may arise in an individual lending scheme.  
On the other hand, if (A4) does not hold, the limited liability constraint is not 
satisfied, and no equilibrium exists under homogeneous lending. This occurs 
when the (LLC) is below the intersection point between the bank’s pooled break-
even line, (0πCPOOL), and the binding participation constraint of safe types, 
)0( ssPC , as point B’ in fig. 2a.  
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Similarly, if the reservation income, u , of borrowers is zero, the safe project’s 
output is lower than the average loan repayment, i.e. pys / , and 
homogeneous group lending is not feasible. That is, it is not possible to 
simultaneously satisfy assumptions (A2) and (A4). For example, in figure 3a it is 
0u , and the only candidate homogeneous equilibrium is the individual liability 
contract, )0,( rp , which will only be accepted by risky types.  
     This section shows that, when homogeneous group lending is not possible, a 
mixed equilibrium may exist and solve the inefficient rationing of safe types. The 
condition is that the mixed limited liability constraint, (LLCMIX), must be less 
stringent than (A4), i.e. that10  
  
pp
ppu
ppppp s
rs
rsrs
2
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 )1(2  

.              (7) 
 
When 0u , (7) is satisfied when )(2/)()1( rsrsrs pppppp  , which 
holds for a non-empty set11 of values of  . And, since the right-hand side of (7) is 
increasing in u , we can state the following   
 
Proposition 3. An equilibrium in mixed groups may exist even if homogeneous 
equilibria are not possible. 
 
     An example of mixed equilibrium is shown in figure 3b, where the (LLCMIX) 
holds, i.e. is above the intersection between the MFI’s mixed zero-profit 
conditions, )0( srC  and )0( rsC . 
The reason why a mixed equilibrium is easier to achieve is that it hinges on ex-
post payments among group members. In contrast to homogeneous group lending, 
in which transfers do not occur, mixed contracts allow to shift more credit risk 
                                                 
10 To ease the comparison, in (7), the assumption (A4) is rewritten in terms of sy , and not of the 
expected profit yyp ss  .  
11 For example, if 8.0sp  and 4.0rp , (7) is satisfied for 1.0 .  
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from MFIs to borrowers. This is partly confirmed by the field data in Guatemala 
of Wydick (2001), who reports that intra-group insurance is relevant and that this 
occurs through shock-contingent transfers. Thus, Proposition 3 implies that mixed 
lending may be a alternative instrument for MFIs to implement group lending 
programs in very poor environments. That is, an opportunity to better meet the 
needs of a fraction of potential borrowers, in particular the poorest, whose outside 
option is very low and who are often less likely to access credit services.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
When (A4) does not hold, the homogeneous equilibrium group payoffs are as 
follows: safe pairs are credit rationed and obtain u ; risky borrowers sign 
individual liability contracts and obtain the full-information payoff, 
Figure 3 – Underinvestment and 0u . 
a) Homogeneous separating and pooling joint liability equilibria do not exist.  
b) Mixed pooling equilibrium. 
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  rrrrr yppU )0,( ; the mixed payoffs, ),( MIXMIXsr crU  and ),( MIXMIXrs crU , 
are again given by (2a) and (2b). As a result, the assortative matching expression, 
(1’), reduces to  
 
0)]0,(),([)],([  ssrrrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsr ypupUcrUcrUu  ,           
   
which always holds under (A1). Therefore, the assortative matching is always 
negative and this means that, if homogeneous contracts are not available, 
borrowers have no choice but to form mixed groups. The reason why risky types 
prefer mixed matching is that they would otherwise receive the lowest possible 
payoff under individual liability lending, i.e.   rrrrr yppU )0,( . 
 
 
7    Conclusions 
 
The main result of this paper is that, in group lending programs, MFIs can obtain 
a Pareto improving solution, over positive assortative matching, by promoting a 
negative matching of borrowers’ types. A complementary result is that a mixed 
equilibrium may exist when homogeneous equilibria are not available, and thus 
solve the credit rationing problems that may arise under group lending.   
There may be several reasons why borrowers may decide to match in 
heterogeneous risk groups. The paper argues that heterogeneity may be due to the 
need of an ex-post insurance system, which works through transfers of money, in-
kind payments or labour services among group members. The main policy 
implication that can be drawn is that MFIs should design their financial products 
by taking into account the potential need for additional risk pooling arrangements, 
other than joint liability.  
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APPENDIX 
 
The Over-Investment Case 
 
This Appendix shows that, in an environment a là de Meza and Webb (1987), the 
sign of the assortative matching again depends on the distribution of borrowers’ 
types. 
Assume rs pp  , and yyy rs  . Assume also that risky firms are socially 
inefficient,  
 
 uyp rr ,                                  (A1’) 
 
and that they nevertheless prefer to ask for outside financing, i.e. that 
 
u
p
ypr 


   .                                  (A2’) 
 
If the (LLC) is satisfied, i.e. if the assumption 
 





rs pp
y 11                                              (A3’) 
 
holds, the homogeneous separating contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr  exists. This means that, risky 
borrowers can be excluded from the credit market, and joint liability separating 
contracts can solve the overinvestment problem. 
     Ghatak (2000) does not extend the overinvestment analysis to the case where 
(A3’) does not hold, i.e. when the (LLC) is below the contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr . In fact, other 
homogeneous separating or pooling equilibria may exist, if y  is not high enough 
to guarantee the presence of the separating contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr . We can distinguish 
between two types of contracts, separating or pooling, analyzed, respectively, in 
subsection A.1 and subsection A.2. 
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A.1    Homogeneous separating contracts below )ˆ,ˆ( cr  
 
This type of separating contracts will depend on the extent of (LLC). Denote by 
*)*,( cr  the contract at the intersection between )0( ssC  and )0( rrPC , and by 
),( cr   the contract at the intersection between )0( POOLC  and )0( rrPC , as 
shown, for example, in fig. 4a. The analysis can be further extended into two 
different subcases: 
 
1) (LLC) on or above *)*,( cr . 
In this case, the separating equilibrium is at the intersection between (LLC) and 
)0( ssC , as contract H in fig. 4a.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Figure 4 – Overinvestment (homogeneous separating equilibria). 
a) LLC below )ˆ,ˆ( cr and above *)*,( cr .                                                                                
b) LLC below *)*,( cr  and above ),( cr  .  
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2) (LLC) below *)*,( cr , but above ),( cr  . 
In this case, the separating equilibrium is at the intersection between (LLC) and 
)0( rrPC , as contract Z in fig. 4b (which highlights a portion of fig. 4a). Note 
that, as in Gangopadhyay et al. (2005), the bank makes positive profits for such 
type of contracts, since they are above the zero-profit condition on safe types, 
)0( SSC .   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Overinvestment (homogeneous pooling equilibria).  
a) Low θ.   
b) High θ. 
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A.2    Homogeneous pooling contract below ),( cr   
 
A second type of homogeneous contracts can be chosen by the MFI when (LLC) 
is below ),( cr  . See, for example, fig. 5a and fig. 5b that consider, respectively, a 
low and a high level of  . All contracts between ),( cr   and )0,( p , along 
)0( POOLC , are potential homogeneous pooling contracts. The set of pooling 
equilibria is determined by the extent of the limited liability constraint (for 
example, all contracts between point M and )0,( p  in fig. 5a, and between N 
and )0,( p  in fig. 5b).  
The condition for the existence of a homogeneous pooling equilibrium is that the 
project’s output in case of success must be larger than the average loan 
repayment, 
 
p
y  ,                          (A4’) 
 
i.e. the same condition needed in an individual liability context. 
 
A.3    Overinvestment and Assortative Matching 
 
Assume that the MFI introduces the mixed contract, ),( MIXMIX cr . Borrowers will 
compare the payoff received under mixed matching with that under homogeneous 
matching. For all potential homogeneous separating equilibria above )ˆ,ˆ( cr , as 
well as for those below )ˆ,ˆ( cr , risky types do not ask for a loan. So, we need to 
rewrite the assortative matching expression derived in Section 4, (1’), as  
 
]),([)],(),([ ucrUcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss  ,             (1’’) 
 
where the risky pairs’ payoff, ),( crU rr , is replaced by the reservation utility, u .  
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For potential homogeneous pooling contracts below ),( cr  , both safe and risky 
types ask for a loan, so we need again the expression (1‘), and not (1’’), to 
compare homogeneous and mixed contracts. 
     Under the bank’s threat of withdrawing the mixed contract, introduced in 
Section 5, the composition of groups in this environment is described by the 
following 
  
Proposition 4. In the overinvestment case, the assortative matching, 
a) if (A3’) holds, is always positive.  
b) if (A3’) does not hold and (A4’) holds, is positive if 21 , and negative 
otherwise.  
 
Proof.  
a) If (A3’) holds, (1’’), evaluated at )ˆ,ˆ( cr , is equal to rr ypu   , which is 
always positive under (A1’).  
b) If (A3’) does not hold and (A4’) holds, (LLC) is below )ˆ,ˆ( cr , and we have to 
consider two different possibilities: 
b1) (LLC) on or above ),( cr  . The potential homogeneous contract is still 
separating. Consider first the least favorable separating contract for safe types, 
i.e., contract ),( cr  . For such contract, (1’’)  is positive if 
 
0
)1(
)](1)1(2[ 



 rr ypu ,                                           (8) 
 
which is always true for 21 , since 0 rr ypu   for (A1’). Besides, given 
that (1’’) is increasing in ),( crU ss , (8) holds for all other possible homogeneous 
separating contracts between ),( cr   and )ˆ,ˆ( cr . 
b2) (LLC) below ),( cr  . In this case, the potential homogeneous contract is 
pooling. Therefore, using (1‘), the matching is positive for 21 .                      ■ 
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    Two comments on Proposition 4 are necessary. First, if the potential 
homogeneous contract is separating, risky types cannot receive a homogeneous 
group loan, so the positive assortative matching can be interpreted as a situation 
where only safe groups exist. Second, the potential pooling homogeneous 
contract, which borrowers compare to the mixed contract, is based on the relative 
social weight,  , chosen by the MFI. For example, if 1 , the homogeneous 
contract is the individual liability pair )0,( p : In such a case, (1’’) reduces to 
])1/[()(2  rrsrs ppppp   , so the matching is positive for 21 . 
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